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THE POST-KOONTZ LANDSCAPE: KOONTZ’S
SHORTCOMINGS AND HOW TO MOVE FORWARD
ABSTRACT
This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s opinion in Koontz v.
St. Johns River Water Management District, and critiques the Court’s
language regarding environmental protection and local government
regulation. In sum, the Koontz opinion reveals that the Court is unsympathetic
to environmental protection at the local level, and is suspicious of local
government’s ability to make reasoned land-use decisions without extorting
unfair value from property owners. The Court’s doubtful attitude regarding the
validity of wetlands protection and local government regulation are
unsupported by the relevant scholarship.
Next, this Comment argues that applying the formulaic takings test
prescribed in Koontz has the negative effect of reducing procedural flexibility
for local land-use decision-makers. Acknowledging Koontz as the new reality
for local governments, local officials will need to adapt to the changes imposed
by expanding the Nollan-Dolan test to permit denials, and address the
confusion caused by issues the Court left open in the opinion. This Comment
recommends a new “negotiated permitting” procedure as a strategy to limit
potentially expanded takings liability under Koontz. Under “negotiated
permitting,” a local government will always approve a permit subject to one
acceptable condition, even if negotiations break down as they did in Koontz.
Approving one condition reduces confusion about which mitigation options
offered in negotiation will be subject to the “nexus” and “rough
proportionality” requirements in the event that a permit applicant brings a
takings claim against the permitting authority.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 25, 2013, the Supreme Court issued an opinion for a case titled
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District.1 While the opinion
received much less popular attention than other high-profile opinions issued
that summer,2 it has generated debate amongst property rights advocates, urban
planners, state and local governments, and environmental advocates about the
current reach of local government power and regulatory takings generally.3
It is important to note here that, while less glamorous than large federal
environmental laws such as the Endangered Species Act,4 local land-use
regulation has perhaps the greatest impact of any environmental law or
regulation on the daily lives of residents within a certain community. The
majority of federal successes regulating pollution and environmental quality
were achieved through “right to pollute” schemes monitoring “point sources”
such as smoke stacks.5 Achieving adequate regulation of “nonpoint source”
pollution remains a major challenge in environmental law, and federal
legislation has not been successful.6 The reality is that land-use decisions,
which generally fall within a local government’s police power, make up a
substantial portion of environmental law, including managing urban sprawl,
protecting wetlands, and preventing pollution hotspots, even though they may
not trigger popular understanding as such.7 Therefore, Koontz is relevant not

1

133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down the definition of marriage in
the Defense of Marriage Act); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (striking down a section of the
Voting Rights Act).
3 See John D. Echeverria, Op-Ed., A Legal Blow to Sustainable Development, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/opinion/a-legal-blow-to-sustainable-development.html; William
Fulton, U.S. Supremes Tighten Screws on Exactions—Is Ehrlich Dead?, CAL. PLAN. & DEV. REP. BLOG (June
25, 2013, 12:46 PM), http://www.cp-dr.com/node/3381; Brian T. Hodges, Koontz—A Banner Day for
Property Rights, PAC. LEGAL FOUND. LIBERTY BLOG (June 25, 2013), http://blog.pacificlegal.org/2013/koontza-banner-day-for-property-rights/; Supreme Court Expands Takings Test, AM. PLAN. ASS’N (June 25, 2013),
http://www.planning.org/newsreleases/2013/jun25.htm.
4 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012).
5 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 113-121);
42 U.S.C. § 7411(b) (2012); id. § 7412(d)(1); see also John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent
of Local Environmental Law, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 366–67 (2002) (describing the federal
government’s struggle to successfully regulate nonpoint pollution sources).
6 Nolon, supra note 5, at 365.
7 See Michelle Bryan Mudd, A “Constant and Difficult Task”: Making Local Land Use Decisions in
States With a Constitutional Right to a Healthful Environment, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 3 (2011) (“[L]ocal
governments stand on the front lines of environmental regulation. . . . Thus, a local government’s role in
assessing the environmental impacts of land development can be profound. A silent community puts the health
2
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just as an exactions decision, but as an important indication of the Court’s
attitude toward local government as an environmental regulator and protector.
Koontz expanded a previous legal test to determine whether a government
has effectuated a regulatory taking via an excessive exaction.8 “Exactions” are
a regulatory tool used by local governments in land-use planning.9 Generally, a
local government will require that a property owner meet a certain condition in
order to grant a permit or other entitlement allowing “the intensified use of real
property.”10 Exactions have traditionally been considered a valuable tool for
local governments in promoting economic development in a community while
requiring builders to internalize some of the external costs.11 This point is key
to the rest of this Comment, which asserts that the Koontz opinion restricts
local governments’ flexibility in land-use decision-making, thus negatively
impacting a very significant environmental protection tool.
Over the past several decades, courts have begun to view the exaction as an
inherently suspect way for local governments to extort unfair benefits from
landowners.12 While exactions must certainly meet a threshold of
constitutionality,13 this Comment argues that the Court mischaracterized
several aspects of the Koontz scenario, resulting in the unwieldy extension of
the “nexus” and “rough proportionality” test to conditions suggested by state
and local governments to land developers prior to permit denials. However,
flexibility is not necessarily precluded by the Koontz holding. Recognizing
Koontz as the new legal reality for local governments, this Comment argues in
favor of regulatory flexibility regarding exactions, and prescribes a
record-generating “negotiated permitting” scheme as a way for local
governments to limit confusion regarding their potentially expanded liability
under Koontz and effectively return to a pre-Koontz regulatory world.
Part I of this Comment provides a history of the exactions cases leading up
to Koontz. Part II describes how Koontz arose, and what was at stake. It also
provides an overview of the majority and dissenting opinions, and discusses
of its environment at risk.”); Joseph L. Sax, Using Property Rights to Attack Environmental Protection, 19
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 715, 715–16 (2002).
8 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2603 (2013).
9
Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the Consequences of
Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609, 613 (2004).
10 Id.
11 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 (“Our precedents . . . enable permitting authorities to insist that applicants
bear the full costs of their proposals . . . .”).
12 See infra Part III.
13 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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public reaction to the outcome. The first section of Part III includes general
background information about wetlands protection to facilitate understanding
of the policy issues in Koontz, and the second section identifies several of the
Court’s mischaracterizations of environmental protection policy and local
government function in the opinion. Part IV discusses the benefits of
regulatory flexibility in exactions decisions, elaborating on why local
governments should adapt to maximize flexibility in spite of Koontz. Part IV
then assesses possible ways that local governments could react to the Koontz
opinion, and proposes, by analogy to federal negotiated rulemaking, that local
governments implement “negotiated permitting” procedures to limit
uncertainty about increased takings challenges under Koontz.
I. THE HISTORY OF EXACTIONS LAW
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”14 This prohibition applies both to federal and state government
takings, but still allows local governments to restrict land in certain ways via
regulation such as permitting and zoning schemes.15 The Supreme Court has
addressed several times whether requiring something from a landowner “as a
condition for issuing a land-use permit” violates the landowner’s constitutional
rights, and “ha[s] long recognized that land-use regulation does not effect a
taking if it ‘substantially advances legitimate state interests’ and does not ‘deny
an over economically viable use of his land.’”16
Historically, the Court has assessed Fifth Amendment takings claims
against regulatory restrictions on private property under a more flexible legal
standard than claims concerning physical occupations or seizures of land.17 For
example, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the Court
considered whether a city effectuated a taking by restricting the development
14

Id.
Id.; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834–36 (1987); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897) (“[S]ince the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment[,]
compensation for private property taken for public uses constitutes an essential element in ‘due process of
law,’ and that without such compensation the appropriation of private property to public uses, no matter under
what form of procedure it is taken, would violate the provisions of the Federal Constitution.”).
16 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
17 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978) (“A ‘taking’ may more
readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government . . . .”); see also John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever? 4–5 (Vt.
Law Sch., Faculty Working Paper No. 28-13, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2316406.
15
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of Grand Central Terminal.18 The Court discussed the nationwide movement to
preserve historic landmarks, noting several aspects of public policy that have
parallels to environmental conservation concerns.19 First, the Court noted that
many historic landmarks have been lost in the years leading up to the case
“without adequate consideration of either the values represented therein or the
possibility of preserving the destroyed properties for use in economically
productive ways.”20 Second, the Court acknowledged the “widely shared belief
that structures with special historic, cultural, or architectural significance
enhance the quality of life for all.”21 The Court’s favorable presentation of
these public policy considerations is in stark contrast to language used in
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District regarding local
government decision-making and environmental protection, as discussed in
Part III.
Ultimately, the Court in Penn Central concluded that it was “unable to
develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require”
that the government pay compensation for “economic injuries caused by public
action.”22 Therefore, the Court concluded that evaluation of such claims was
necessarily on an “ad hoc, factual” basis.23 Factors to consider include:
(1) “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly,
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations” and (2) “the character of the governmental
action.”24
In 1987, the Court had the opportunity to refine its approach to regulatory
restrictions on private land-use in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.25
There, the Nollan family wanted to exercise their option to purchase a
shorefront piece of land that they had leased for years.26 In order to exercise
their option to purchase the property, they had to tear down the existing
bungalow structure and replace it.27 Such a project required the approval of the

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

438 U.S. at 107.
Id. at 107–08.
Id. at 108.
Id.
Id. at 124.
Id.
Id.
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
Id. at 827.
Id. at 828.
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California Coastal Commission (Coastal Commission).28 Upon consideration
of the Nollans’ application, the Coastal Commission “granted the permit
subject to their recordation of a deed restriction” allowing a public pathway
along the ocean line of the property.29
The Nollans contested this outcome, and eventually the case landed in front
of the Supreme Court.30 While acknowledging that the Court had previously
recognized “a broad range of governmental purposes and regulations” that
qualified as “legitimate state interests” and thus did not constitute a taking,
Justice Scalia reasoned that the “constitutional propriety” of the Coastal
Commission’s action depended on the existence of an “essential nexus”
between the proposed project and the condition of the permit.31 The Court
found no “essential nexus” between the Nollans’ construction project and the
Coastal Commission’s easement requirement, and therefore held that the
Coastal Commission’s permit condition could not “be treated as an exercise of
its land-use power.”32
The Court elaborated on the “nexus” requirement in 1994 in Dolan v. City
of Tigard.33 The case concerned Dolan’s proposed redevelopment project on
land including a 100-year floodplain subject to restrictions under a local
government’s comprehensive zoning scheme.34 Dolan applied to the City
Planning Commission (Tigard Commission) for the necessary permits to
expand her plumbing and electric store located on the site.35 Consistent with
the existing zoning scheme, the Tigard Commission approved the permit
subject to Dolan improving a storm drainage system within the 100-year
floodplain and dedicating a portion of it to the city greenway, and dedicating
an adjacent strip of land for a pedestrian and bicycle pathway.36
When the Tigard Commission denied her variance requests, Dolan
appealed to the local Land Use Board, the Oregon Court of Appeals, and the
Oregon Supreme Court, all of which affirmed the decision of the Tigard

28

Id.
Id.
30 See id. at 828–31 (reciting procedural history).
31 Id. at 834–37.
32 Id. at 838–42.
33 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994).
34 Id. at 377–81. The state statute required “all Oregon cities and counties to adopt new comprehensive
land use plans that were consistent with the statewide planning goals.” Id. at 377.
35 Id. at 379.
36 Id. at 381–82.
29
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Commission.37 But when the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
settle “an alleged conflict between the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision and
[its] decision in Nollan,” it ultimately reversed.38 Unlike in Nollan, the Court
found that the floodplain and pedestrian/bicycle pathway requirements had an
adequate nexus to the “legitimate public purpose” claimed by the Tigard
Commission (flood prevention and traffic reduction).39 Therefore, the Court
moved on to the second part of the analysis that it did not reach in Nollan:
“whether the degree of the exactions demanded by the city’s permit conditions
bears the required relationship to the projected impact of petitioner’s proposed
development.”40
The Court approached this inquiry by assessing whether the evidentiary
findings of the Tigard Commission were sufficient to support the conditions to
the building permit.41 The Court considered three tests and settled on the
intermediate “reasonable relationship” test that had already been adopted by
“many other jurisdictions,” renaming it the “rough proportionality test.”42
Under this test, “[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city
must make some sort of individualized determination that the required
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development.”43 The Court found that the Tigard Commission had not
presented evidence to show why the floodplain area had to be dedicated to the
public greenway and not privately conserved.44 Furthermore, the Tigard
Commission had not shown sufficient support for the pedestrian/bicycle
pathway because the findings showed that the pathway “could” reduce traffic
demand, instead of a stronger finding.45
In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., the Court attempted to summarize its
collection of regulatory takings cases.46 While admitting that its body of
regulatory takings jurisprudence “[could not] be characterized as unified,” the
Court noted that the cases “share a common touchstone.”47 According to
37

Id. at 382–83.
Id. at 383, 396.
39 Id. at 387–88.
40 Id. at 388.
41 Id. at 389.
42 See id. at 389–91 (renaming the test in order to avoid confusion with the “rational basis” level of
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
43 Id. at 391.
44 Id. at 392–95.
45 Id. at 395–96.
46 544 U.S. 528, 537–40 (2005).
47 Id. at 539.
38
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Justice O’Connor, “[e]ach aims to identify regulatory actions that are
functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly
appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.
Accordingly, each of these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the
burden that government imposes upon private property rights.”48
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, named two situations that
would generally be deemed per se takings requiring just compensation:
(1) where government has forced a landowner “to suffer a permanent physical
invasion,”49 and (2) where government has “deprive[d] an owner of ‘all
economically beneficial use’ of her property.”50 Outside of these two “narrow
categories . . . regulatory takings challenges are governed by the standards set
forth in Penn Central.”51
The Court also discussed the Nollan and Dolan decisions, clarifying that
the “nexus” and “rough proportionality” test applies only with regulatory
exactions where the question is: “[Can the government], without paying the
compensation that would otherwise be required upon effecting such a taking,
demand the easement as a condition for granting a development permit the
government was entitled to deny[?]”52
Many scholars celebrated this summary in Lingle as bringing clarity and a
sense of judicial restraint to the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence,
including an explanation of Nollan and Dolan in the broader framework.53
Furthermore, the fact that the Court issued the opinion unanimously provided
hope for a more coherent takings framework moving forward.54 However,
according to Professor John Echeverria, a professor at the Vermont Law
School, these “hopes have been dashed by Koontz.”55

48

Id.
Id. at 538 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)).
50 Id. (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992)).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 546–48.
53 Robert G. Dreher, Lingle’s Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due Process from Takings Doctrine, 30
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 371, 372 (2006) (“Lingle brings a remarkable coherence to the Court’s confused
regulatory takings doctrine. The paradigm of a regulatory taking that emerges . . . is relatively clear, and quite
narrow.”); Echeverria, supra note 17, at 12; Winfield B. Martin, Comment, Order for the Courts: Reforming
the Nollan/Dolan Threshold Inquiry for Exactions, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1499, 1501 (2012) (“In
reconsidering and streamlining its takings jurisprudence, the Court whittled decisively away at the very
underpinnings of [the Nollan and Dolan] body of law. . . .”).
54 Echeverria, supra note 17, at 12.
55 Id.
49
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE KOONTZ CASE IN CONTEXT
This Part provides background information about the Koontz case,
describing the facts and procedural history. This Part then discusses what was
at stake in the resolution of Koontz, and describes the majority and dissenting
opinions. Finally, commentary from environmentalists, city planners, and
property rights advocates illustrates the divided public reaction to the opinion.
A. Koontz’s Facts and Procedural History
In 1972, Coy Koontz, Sr.56 purchased 14.9 acres of undeveloped land near
a highway east of Orlando.57 The state of Florida had classified a large portion
of the land as wetlands, and Koontz was therefore required to obtain a
development permit from the St. Johns Water Management District (District)
under Florida’s Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act (Henderson
Act), which had jurisdiction over his property.58 Under the Henderson Act, the
state requires that landowners “provide ‘reasonable assurance’ that proposed
construction on wetlands is ‘not contrary to the public interest.’”59
Furthermore, the landowner must select a form of mitigation that “offset[s] the
adverse effects” of the development.60
Koontz applied for a development permit in 1994.61 To offset the adverse
effects of his proposed development plan, Koontz offered to place eleven acres
of his land in a conservation easement.62 The District found his proposal
inadequate and suggested alternatives, such as increasing the size of the
conservation easement while decreasing the size of the development or
proceeding with the development plan and paying to restore wetlands on
District-owned land.63 The District also stated that they would “favorably

56

Coy Koontz, Sr. passed away while the case was working its way through the courts, and his estate
was represented by Coy Koontz, Jr. here. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591
(2013). This Comment uses “Koontz” interchangeably for both men throughout to indicate the petitioner
before the U.S. Supreme Court.
57 Id. at 2591–92.
58 Id. at 2592; see also Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 720 So. 2d 560, 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998) (“The property is located on a tributary of the Econlockhatchee River in an area now designated by
the . . . District . . . as a part of a designated hydrologic basin and largely within the Riparian Habitat
Protection Zone.”) (upholding the District’s jurisdiction over the hydrologic basin under state statute).
59 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 373.414(1) (2013)).
60 FLA. STAT. § 373.414(1)(b) (2014); see also Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592.
61 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592.
62 Id. at 2592–93.
63 Id. at 2593.
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consider” alternatives suggested by Koontz.64 Dissatisfied with the options
before him, Koontz refused to negotiate and the District denied his
application.65
Koontz filed suit in state court, claiming he was entitled to “monetary
damages” due to the District’s “unreasonable exercise of . . . police power
constituting a taking without just compensation.”66 The Florida Circuit Court
found that Koontz had not exhausted all of his administrative remedies and
granted the District’s motion to dismiss.67 The Florida District Court of Appeal
for the Fifth Circuit reversed, and, on remand, the Florida Circuit Court found
the District’s actions constituted a taking under the Nollan-Dolan test.68
Thereafter, the Florida District Court affirmed, but the Florida Supreme Court
reversed, distinguishing Nollan and Dolan.69 The Florida Supreme Court
distinguished Nollan and Dolan from the Koontz’s case because in their case,
the District denied the permit, rather than granting it subject to a condition.70 In
addition, the court addressed whether a demand for money, rather than real
property, could constitute a taking under the Nollan-Dolan test, and concluded
that it could not.71 The U.S. Supreme Court, acknowledging a divide amongst
the lower courts with respect to these issues, granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict.72
B. What Was at Stake in Koontz?
At stake in Koontz was the resolution of two questions regarding exactions:
(1) whether a permit denial was subject to the Nollan-Dolan test, and
(2) whether a demand for money could constitute a taking requiring just
compensation.73 Advocating for Koontz, the Association of Florida
Community Developers submitted an amicus curiae brief expressing concern
64

Id.
Id. at 2591.
66 Id. at 2593 (citing FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (2013)).
67 Id.
68 Id. In finding that the District’s actions constituted a taking, the Florida District Court of Appeals
ordered the District to issue the permit and awarded $376,154 in damages. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Mgmt. Dist., 5 So. 3d 8, 17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); see also Lyle Denniston, Argument preview: When is a
Civic Task a “Taking”?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 14, 2013, 10:46 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/01/
argument-preview-when-is-a-civic-task-a-taking/.
69 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 2594.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 2595, 2598.
65
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about maintaining the integrity of the land-use decision-making process.74
While acknowledging that “‘the centrality of negotiation’ is sacrosanct” in
Florida with respect to state and local agencies’ ability to balance private and
public interests, the organization argued that the Nollan-Dolan test should
apply to permit denials and demands for money to “curb the abuses that
currently occur,” and “reduce the need for after-the-fact litigation.”75 Similarly,
small business owners argued for the extension of the Nolan-Dollan test to
assuage a fear that “their property rights w[ould] be held hostage to
extortionate quid pro quo demands.”76 Similar amicus briefs articulated a need
to keep government in check with a ruling in favor of Koontz.77
Others filed amicus briefs in support of the District. Local governments
worried that expanding the Nollan-Dolan test to permit denials would be
“illogical, unworkable, and unnecessary.”78 Urban planners feared that
applying the test to permit denials would reduce the ability of local
governments to negotiate with applicants, therefore reducing the quality of
development decision-making.79 Furthermore, wetland scientists and
academics observed that in order to offset the negative effect of development
on wetlands, governments have to require exactions that eliminate or offset
wetland function.80 Wetland destruction has “adverse environmental, public
safety, and economic impacts” that may not be apparent to a permit applicant,
and “[o]ne acre of wetland is not necessarily equivalent to another acre of
wetland.”81 Therefore, adequate mitigation frequently requires efforts and costs
beyond a one-to-one ratio of land developed to land preserved.82

74 Brief of Amici Curiae Association of Florida Community Developers et al. in Support of the Petitioner
at 1–2, Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (No. 11-1447), 2012 WL 6054086.
75 Id. at 3–5 (quoting Gen. Dev. Corp. v. Div. of State Planning, Dep’t of Admin., 353 So. 2d 1199, 1206
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)).
76 Brief of Amicus Curiae of The National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal
Center at 2, Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (No. 11-1447), 2012 WL 5982591.
77 Brief Amicus Curiae of for Hillcrest Property, LLP in Support of Petitioner at 16, Koontz, 133 S. Ct.
2586 (No. 11-1447), 2012 WL 6042216; Brief Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, by National Association of
Home Builders et al. at 16, Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (No. 11-1447); Brief Amicus Curiae of Owners’ Counsel
of America in Support of the Petitioner at 4, Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (No. 11-1447).
78 Amici Curiae Brief of the National Governors Association et al. in Support of Respondent at 1,
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (No. 11-1447), 2012 WL 6755147.
79 Brief of the American Planning Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 6,
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (No. 11-1447), 2012 WL 6759407.
80 See Brief of Former Members of the National Research Council Committee on Mitigating Wetland Losses
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 3, Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (No. 11-1447), 2012 WL 6762583.
81 Id. at 3.
82 Id. at 4.
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Most notably, the United States Solicitor General’s Office (Solicitor
General) elected to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the District.83
Although the Solicitor General is generally regarded as “in a class by itself” in
terms of amicus influence,84 here the Court ultimately deviated from both
conclusions advocated in the Solicitor General’s amicus brief.85
The United States’ interest in the outcome of the case stemmed from the
power of the federal government to regulate wetland protection under the
Clean Water Act, viewing this power as parallel to the power of the state of
Florida to regulate wetlands and land-use under state statutes.86 The Solicitor
General indicated that “[t]he United States has a substantial interest in the
sound development of the relevant constitutional analysis in cases that may
affect its ability to implement the Clean Water Act, consistent with
constitutional protections.”87 Accordingly, the Solicitor General argued that a
permit denial could be the basis for a takings claim according to the factors
articulated in Penn Central, but not under the Nollan-Dolan exactions theory,
and furthermore that applying the Nollan-Dolan test to analyze a permit
conditioned on paying money was inappropriate.88
C. Koontz Majority Opinion
Justice Alito penned the majority opinion, joined by Justices Roberts,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.89 First, the Court addressed whether a permit
denial could be subject to the Nollan-Dolan “nexus” and “rough

83 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (No.
11-1447), 2012 WL 6755146 [hereinafter Brief for U.S.]; see also Kristen A. Norman-Major, The Solicitor
General: Executive Policy Agendas and the Court, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1081, 1095 (1994) (explaining that the
Solicitor General’s ability to file amicus briefs is discretionary and therefore indicates which cases the
executive thinks are important).
84 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 761 (2000) (observing that citations to amicus briefs from the Solicitor General’s Office
have increased during the past fifty years).
85 Compare Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591 (concluding “that Nollan and Dolan cannot be evaded” even
though “[t]he District did not approve his application on the condition that he surrender an interest in his
land”), with Brief for U.S., supra note 83, at 15, 17 (“The government’s denial of a development permit can be
the basis for a Fifth Amendment claim for compensation under Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), but not under an exaction-takings theory.”).
86 See Brief for U.S., supra note 83, at 5 (citing various provisions of the Clean Water Act, including 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344(a), 1362(6)–(7) (2012)).
87 Brief for U.S., supra note 83, at 2.
88 Id. at 15.
89 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591.
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proportionality” test.90 The Court grounded its reasoning in the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, citing previous decisions holding that “the
government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a
constitutional right.”91 Applied to land-use permitting, the Court noted that
“Nollan and Dolan ‘involve a special application’ of this doctrine that protects
the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation for property the government
takes when owners apply for land-use permits.”92 The Court further explained
that “[e]xtortionate demands” from local governments “frustrate” landowners’
rights under the Fifth Amendment, and are therefore prohibited by the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.93 On this point, the Court was particularly
concerned about local governments attempting to “evade” the Nollan-Dolan
test via a language formality, reasoning that granting a permit with a condition
attached is no different than withholding a permit until a certain condition is
met.94 Therefore, the Court held that the Nollan-Dolan “nexus” and “rough
proportionality” test does apply in the context of permit denials, and that “[a]
contrary rule would be . . . untenable.”95
Second, the Court addressed the issue of whether a demand for money
could constitute a taking that requires just compensation.96 The Court
distinguished Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,97 where a plurality of four justices
found that a retroactive statutory imposition of financial liability was “so
arbitrary that it violated the Takings Clause,” but Justice Kennedy (in his
controlling opinion) joined the four dissenting justices in finding “that the
Takings Clause does not apply to government-imposed financial obligations
that ‘do not operate upon or alter an identified property interest.’”98 While the
District argued that requiring Koontz to spend money to improve public land
could not “operate upon or alter an identified property interest,” and therefore
could not give rise to a taking, the Court disagreed.99 In the Court’s opinion,
the demand for money did “operate upon . . . an identified property interest”
because it required that the property owner make the payment.100 The Court
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Id. at 2594–98.
Id. at 2594 (quoting Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983)).
Id. (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005)).
Id. at 2595.
Id. at 2595–96.
Id. at 2595.
Id. at 2598.
524 U.S. 498 (1998).
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599 (quoting E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)).
Id.
Id.
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found it appropriate to apply the Nollan-Dolan test to a demand for money that
links to a “specific parcel of real property” due to the “risk that the government
may use its substantial power and discretion in land-use permitting to pursue
governmental ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to the
effects of the proposed new use of the specific property at issue.”101 Answering
Justice Kagan’s dissent, discussed in the next section, the Court also declined
to elaborate on the theoretical distinctions between a tax and a taking because
it “had little trouble distinguishing between the two” in the facts of the case.102
D. Koontz Dissenting Opinion
In Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Sotomayor, Justice Kagan agreed with the majority as to the first question
of whether Nollan-Dolan applied to permit denials, with two caveats.103 First,
and most importantly, she agreed that the Nollan-Dolan test would apply if a
local government actually made a demand, but she and the dissenting justices
failed to see how the District had made a demand given the facts of Koontz,
noting that the District “never demanded anything (including money) in
exchange for a permit.”104 Second, while the majority indicated that Koontz
may be entitled to recover monetary damages under state law, Kagan
disagreed, arguing no taking had actually occurred.105
Kagan dedicated the remainder of the dissent to disagreeing with the
majority opinion about whether a demand for money can constitute a taking
(assuming there is such a demand, which she did not concede was present in
Koontz).106 Kagan would hold that it does not.107 In Kagan’s view, the
Nollan-Dolan test applies when the government seeks something it would
otherwise have to pay for, were it not operating within a land-use permit
setting.108 Therefore, she found that a demand for money could only be a
taking if the requirement to pay would constitute a taking outside of the permit

101

Id. at 2600.
Id. at 2601–02.
103 Id. at 2603–04 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
104 Id. (“The Nollan-Dolan standard applies not only when the government approves a development
permit conditioned on the owner’s conveyance of a property interest (i.e., imposes a condition subsequent), but
also when the government denies a permit until the owner meets the condition (i.e., imposes a condition
precedent).”).
105 Id. at 2604.
106 Id. at 2605.
107 Id.
108 Id.
102
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setting, and interpreted Eastern Enterprises to mean that the answer is no.109
Kagan cited to Kennedy’s controlling opinion, where he stated that if a law
“d[oes] not ‘operate upon or alter’ a ‘specific and identified property or
property right,’” there is no taking.110 Synthesized with Justice Breyer’s
four-justice dissent, which found “that the Takings Clause applies only when
the government appropriates a ‘specific interest in physical or intellectual
property’ or ‘a specific, separately identifiable fund of money[,]’”111 Kagan
concluded that “a requirement that a person pay money to repair public
wetlands is not a taking.”112
Kagan worried that expanding the Takings Clause to include demands for
money would harm local governments, where prevalent use of permitting fees
as a regulatory tool facilitates mitigation of adverse development impacts.113
Furthermore, while the majority was quick to say that there is no problem
distinguishing takings from taxes,114 Kagan asserted, to the contrary, that state
and local governments often “struggle to draw a coherent boundary.”115
E. Public Reaction to the Koontz Outcome
The Koontz decision generated mixed reviews. Commentators made
statements ranging from, “Koontz . . . is one of the worst—if not the worst—
decision in the pantheon of the Supreme Court takings decisions,”116 to
“reading . . . Koontz . . . is like being a kid . . . in a candy store” for property
rights advocates.117 Still others claimed that the opinion would have little
effect, stating that “[w]hile there has been much wringing of hands . . . Koontz
did not change the law.”118
John Echeverria quickly expressed his disappointment in a New York Times
Op-Ed published the day after the Court released the decision.119 He
109

Id.
Id. (quoting E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540–41 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)).
111 Id. (quoting E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 554–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
112 Id. at 2606.
113 Id. at 2607 (“[T]he flexibility of state and local governments to take the most routine actions to
enhance their communities will diminish . . . .”).
114 Id. at 2601–02 (majority opinion).
115 Id. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
116 Echeverria, supra note 17, at 1.
117 Hodges, supra note 3.
118 David L. Callies, Koontz Redux: Where We Are and What’s Left, PLAN. & ENVTL. L., Oct. 2013, at 7,
7 (2013).
119 Echeverria, supra note 3.
110
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characterized the decision as a “Blow to Sustainable Development” because
“the ruling creates a perverse incentive for municipal governments to reject
applications from developers rather than attempt to negotiate project designs
that might advance both public and private goals.”120 The American Planning
Association (APA) expressed similar concern and disappointment, worrying
that the decision “create[d] a terrible precedent allowing landowners to
determine what they feel are sufficient mitigation efforts.”121 Patricia Salkin,
the chair of the APA’s Amicus Curiae Committee, stated that the conversations
between applicants and permitting authorities “will now occur less often given
today’s ruling.”122 In addition, state and local government officials and
interested parties read the decision and wondered what the implications would
be for state laws.123
Echeverria followed his criticism in the New York Times with a working
paper, sarcastically questioning: Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision
Ever?124 He protested that the opinion “conflicts with established doctrine in
several respects and even misrepresents pertinent precedent.”125 In addition, he
argued that “the majority does not explain whether or how it thinks established
doctrine should or could be reformulated to accommodate its novel
conclusions.”126 Echeverria also noted that Koontz has created tension with the
unanimous Supreme Court decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,127 which
“provided . . . reason to hope that the Court had settled on a more coherent and

120

Id.
Supreme Court Expands Takings Test, supra note 3.
122 Id.
123 Fulton, supra note 3; Koontz Decision Extends Property Owners’ Constitutional Protections, LATHAM
& WATKINS CLIENT ALERT COMMENT., 3 (July 17, 2013), http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/LW-koontzdecision-property-protection.pdf (“It is not apparent . . . that the Court will accept the distinction drawn by the
California Supreme Court in Ehrlich, and it could apply the Koontz protections broadly.”).
124 Echeverria, supra note 17, at 1.
125 Id.; see also John Echeverria, Horne v. Department of Agriculture: An Invitation to Reexamine
“Ripeness” Doctrine in Takings Litigation, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10735, 10748 (2013) (“Koontz[] reflect[s] a
willingness to twist or abandon established doctrine in order to achieve desired outcomes and/or suggest new
avenues for using the Takings Clause to challenge government action.”) (footnote omitted).
126 Echeverria, supra note 17, at 1. Echeverria argued that applying the Nollan-Dolan test to permit
denials is problematic because it shifts the burden to governments to show that they have satisfied the
requirements. Id. at 7. Echeverria also criticized the Court’s failure to cite at all to City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 544 U.S. 528 (2005), which was essential to the decision of the Florida
Supreme Court, and for citing to Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 526 U.S. 687 (1999) only once, which he
argued was a particularly important decision “because it created a new, unifying coherence for takings law as a
whole.” Id. at 12, 19.
127 526 U.S. 687.
121
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predictable law of takings.”128 Echerverria commented that “[s]adly, those
hopes have been dashed by Koontz.”129
On the other side, private property rights advocates celebrated. The Pacific
Legal Foundation (PLF), which represented Koontz in the case, dubbed the day
the decision was handed down A Banner Day for Property Rights.130 The
author of the blog post accompanying this proclamation enthusiastically
claimed “There is just so much good stuff in the opinion—I almost feel guilty.
Mind you, I don’t.”131 Several days later, the site posted a graphic depicting
Coy Koontz, Jr. with overlaid text declaring “In Koontz, one family’s battle
with a government agency became a huge win for the Constitution.”132 PLF’s
enthusiasm was echoed by many private firms, watchdog organizations, and
academic blogs whose members were excited by the perceived strengthening
of private property rights against the threat of extortion at the hands of the
government.133
Still another set of commentators hypothesized that Koontz will have no
practical effect on local governments,134 although the true effect remains to be
seen as new local government decisions make their way through the appeals
process.

128 Echeverria, supra note 17, at 12. Contra Robert H. Thomas, Surprise! Environmental Lawprof Dislikes
INVERSECONDEMNATION.COM
(June
27,
2013),
http://www.inversecondemnation.com/
Koontz,
inversecondemnation/2013/06/surprise-environmental-lawprof-dislikes-koontz.html (opining that Echeverria
“has never met a taking he’s liked” and that “[t]he post-opinion commentary that Koontz will unduly bind the
hands of land regulators . . . isn’t a serious concern”).
129 Echeverria, supra note 17, at 12.
130 Hodges, supra note 3.
131 Id.
132 Koontz, a “Supreme” Victory for Property Rights, PAC. LEGAL FOUND. LIBERTY BLOG (July 1, 2013),
http://blog.pacificlegal.org/2013/koontz-a-supreme-victory-for-property-rights/.
133 See Michael M. Berger, Supreme Court Limits Land Development Permit Conditions, MANATT (June
26, 2013), http://www.manatt.com/Real_Estate_and_Land_Use/Supreme_Court_Limits_Conditions.aspx
(“[Koontz] sets forth some useful clarity regarding the ability of local government to engage in
‘extortionate’ . . . actions toward permit applicants.”); Larry Salzman, Koontz Decision: Victory for Property
Rights, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 25, 2013, 5:45 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/352016/koontzdecision-victory-property-rights-larry-salzman (“Today the Supreme Court said, no: It is unconstitutional to
use the permit process as a tool of extortion . . . .”); Ilya Somin, Thoughts on the Koontz Takings Clause Case,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 25, 2013, 1:07 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/06/25/thoughts-on-the-koontztakings-clause-case/ (“Overall, Koontz is the most important victory for property rights in the Supreme Court
for a long time.”).
134 Amy Brigham Boulris, Substance Prevails Over Form in Property Rights Case, DAILY BUS. REV., July
15, 2013, http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/PubArticleDBR.jsp?id=1202610781240 (“Koontz did not
change the law so much as protect against nonsensical loopholes.”).
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III. MISCHARACTERIZATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT IN THE KOONTZ OPINION
This Part analyzes and critiques the Koontz opinion. The first section
provides a discussion of wetlands science and policy to facilitate understanding
about why wetlands protection is a good idea. The second section compares the
principles of wetlands protection and environmental protection generally with
the language of the Koontz opinion. In addition, it argues that the Court makes
incorrect and unsupported assertions about environmental policy, and argues
against the Court’s description of local governments as extortionate
over-regulators.
A. Basic Wetlands Protection Science and Policy
This section briefly explains that federal and state governments protect
wetlands because of the valuable ecosystem services they provide, further
illustrating issues raised by the Koontz opinion.
In 1979, the U.S. Department of the Interior Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) issued a report on the classification of wetlands that defined wetlands
as “lands transitional between terrestrial and aquatic systems where the water
table is usually at or near the surface or the land is covered by shallow
water.”135 This definition was cited with approval by the FWS in a 2011 report
on the updated status of national wetlands, and is similar to definitions used by
other federal administrative agencies.136
135

L. M. COWARDIN ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, CLASSIFICATION
WETLANDS AND DEEPWATER HABITATS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1979), available at http://www.npwrc.
usgs.gov/resource/1998/classwet/classwet.htm. “For purposes of this classification wetlands must have one or
more of the following three attributes: (1) at least periodically, the land supports predominantly hydrophytes;
(2) the substrate is predominantly undrained hydric soil; and (3) the substrate is nonsoil and is saturated with
water or covered by shallow water at some time during the growing season of each year.” Id. (footnotes
omitted).
136 T. E. DAHL, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, STATUS AND TRENDS OF
WETLANDS IN THE CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES 2004 TO 2009 20 (2011), available at http://www.fws.gov/
wetlands/Documents/Status-and-Trends-of-Wetlands-in-the-Conterminous-United-States-2004-to-2009.pdf;
see also 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (2013) (defining wetlands as “those areas that are inundated or saturated by
surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances
do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions” for the purpose of
setting guidelines applicable to the specification of disposal sites for discharges of dredged or fill materials in
waters of the United States); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF WATER, PUB. NO. EPA 843-F-04-011a,
WETLANDS OVERVIEW (2004), available at http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/upload/overviewpr.pdf [hereinafter WETLANDS OVERVIEW] (“Wetlands are the link between the land and the water. They are
transition zones where the flow of water, the cycling of nutrients, and the energy of the sun meet to produce a
unique ecosystem characterized by hydrology, soils, and vegetation . . . .”).
OF
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Wetlands provide ecosystem services137 such as providing habitat for plants
and animals, controlling floods, absorbing pollutants before they reach the
water supply, and providing recreation opportunities.138 These services
“combine with manufactured and human capital services to produce human
welfare.”139
One of the most important of these functions is flood control.140 According
to an EPA fact sheet, “[a] one-acre wetland can typically store about three-acre
feet of water, or one million gallons.”141 In addition, “[t]rees and other wetland
vegetation help slow the speed of flood waters.”142 These unique wetland
characteristics “can actually lower flood heights and reduce the water’s
destructive potential.”143
Wetlands can also treat wastewater at a cost comparable to building a new
wastewater treatment plant.144 For example, an EPA case study found that a
constructed wetland wastewater treatment system in South Carolina could
“significantly lower the cost of wastewater treatment because the systems rely
on plant and animal growth instead of the addition of power or chemicals.”145
Using constructed wetlands for wastewater treatment has the added feature of
maintaining hundreds of acres of land in “a natural ecological condition,”
allowing the community to enjoy additional recreation and environmental
education benefits.146

137 See Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387
NATURE 253, 253 (1997) (defining ecosystem services as “the benefits human populations derive, directly or
indirectly, from ecosystem functions”).
138 WETLANDS OVERVIEW, supra note 136 (“Often called ‘nurseries of life,’ wetlands provide habitat for
thousands of species of aquatic and terrestrial plants and animals.”).
139 Costanza et al., supra note 137, at 254.
140 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF WATER, PUB. NO. EPA 843-F-06-001, WETLANDS:
PROTECTING LIFE AND PROPERTY FROM FLOODING (2006), available at http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/
outreach/upload/Flooding.pdf (discussing six case studies in which wetlands reduced the negative effects of
flooding).
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PUB. NO. EPA832-R-93-005, CONSTRUCTED WETLANDS FOR
WASTEWATER TREATMENT AND WILDLIFE HABITAT (1993), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/
LPS42176 (“[Constructed wetland] systems offer an effective means of integrating wastewater treatment and
resource enhancement, often at a cost that is competitive with conventional wastewater treatment
alternatives.”).
145 Id.
146 Id.
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Although difficult to quantify, studies confirm that wetlands have
significant economic benefits when the services discussed above are translated
into monetary equivalents.147 Quantifying ecosystem services is controversial,
but according to many ecological economists, “[t]o say that we should not do
valuation of ecosystems is to simply deny the reality that we already do,
always have and cannot avoid doing so in the future.”148 “Failure to quantify
ecosystem values in commensurate terms with opportunity costs often results
in an implicit value of zero being placed on ecosystem services. In most cases,
ecosystem services have values larger than zero.”149
The need to protect wetlands and other environmental resources whose
value is not readily identifiable in monetary terms is the impetus for the “no
overall net loss” policy implemented by federal and state governments with
respect to wetlands.150 Per this policy, agencies seek to achieve “‘no net loss’
of wetland acreage and function” when issuing certain land-use permits.151
While simple in theory, a “no net loss” policy is difficult to implement because
a “one-to-one acreage replacement may not adequately compensate for the
aquatic resource functions and services lost,” and the value of ecosystem
services can be subjective.152 In addition, ecosystem services have many
characteristics of public goods, making them difficult to privatize and
exchange on the free market.153 Because of these challenges, wetland
regulation and development is often contested, particularly by private wetland
owners who want to develop lands restricted by wetland development
permitting schemes.

147 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF WATER, PUB. NO. EPA843-F-06-004, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF
WETLANDS (2006), available at http:// water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/upload/EconomicBenefits.pdf.
148 Robert Costanza et al., The Value of Ecosystem Services: Putting the Issues in Perspective, 25
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 67, 68 (1998).
149 John Loomis et al., Measuring the Total Economic Value of Restoring Ecosystem Services in an
Impaired River Basin: Results from a Contingent Valuation Survey, 33 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 103, 104 (2000)
(citation omitted).
150 40 C.F.R. § 230.93(a)(1) (2013) (“The fundamental objective of compensatory mitigation is to offset
environmental losses resulting from unavoidable impacts to waters of the United States authorized by DA
permits.”); Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594, 19,604 (Apr. 10,
2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 230) (supplemental information).
151 Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. at 19,594 (supplemental
information).
152 See id. at 19,604; James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental
Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 611–12 (2000).
153 Loomis et al., supra note 149, at 105.
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B. The Koontz Opinion Conflicts with the Policy Realities of Environmental
Protection and Local Government
This section critiques the Court’s unsympathetic attitude towards
environmental protection in the first subsection, and the Court’s distrust of
local government in the second subsection.
1. Environmental Protection
Despite the ecological and economic importance of wetlands,154 recent
Supreme Court cases tightened the ability of the federal government and local
governments to ensure the stability of wetlands, and exhibited a hostility
towards environmental protection generally, while strengthening private
property rights.155 For example, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, Justice
Scalia, writing for the Court, denied standing to plaintiffs who alleged an
injury arising from a rule that reduced protections for species under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA).156 He reasoned that the plaintiffs lacked a
“factual showing of perceptible harm,” despite the expansive language of the
citizen suit provision of the ESA.157 In Rapanos v. Unites States, Justice Scalia,
writing for a plurality of the Court, asserted that “waters of the United
States”158 did not include “transitory puddles or ephemeral flows of water”
under the Clean Water Act, belittling the importance of such waters that did
not fit within his “commonsense understanding of the term.”159 Such assertions
are unsupported by science, despite the Court’s best efforts to categorize areas
as “water” or “land” for the purpose of a neat legal test.160
Given the Court’s growing hostility to environmental claims in one strain
of cases over the past two decades, the Court’s tone regarding the
154

See supra Part III.A.
See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v.
United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1992).
156 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 556–78.
157 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (1988) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2012)) (granting a
cause of action to “any person” in order “to enjoin any person, including the United States . . . who is alleged
to be in violation of any provision of this chapter or regulation issued under the authority thereof”); Lujan, 504
U.S. at 566–67.
158 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1326(7) (2012)).
159 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732–34.
160 See FED. GEOGRAPHIC DATA COMM. & U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., WETLANDS SUBCOMM., PUB NO.
FGDC-STD-004-2013, CLASSIFICATION OF WETLANDS AND DEEPWATER HABITATS OF THE UNITED STATES,
5–6 (2d ed. 2013), available at https://www.fgdc.gov/standards/projects/FGDC-standards-projects/wetlands/
nvcs-2013 [hereinafter DEEPWATER HABITATS].
155
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environmental findings of the District in Koontz is unsurprising.161 As in
previous cases, the Court made unfounded assertions about the legitimacy of
the science used to define wetlands in the local Florida permitting scheme.162
For example, Justice Alito incredulously described Koontz’s land by stating
that “[a]lthough largely classified as wetlands by the State, the northern section
drains well; the most significant standing water forms in ruts in an unpaved
road used to access the power lines.”163 As discussed above,164 one of the
defining features of a wetland is that it represents a continuum between wet
and dry.165 Therefore, the fact that the area does not always hold standing
water, but rather “drains well,” does not mean that the area is not a
scientifically legitimate wetland, as the Court implied.166
Furthermore, the Court noted that “[t]he property is located less than 1,000
feet from . . . one of Orlando’s major thoroughfares,” and that power lines
bisect the property.167 This description of the land emphasizes the urban,
developed character of the surrounding area and deemphasizes the value of
natural wetland services.168 By contrast, “[e]ven small wetlands in urban areas
provide important pollution control services to the local population, and
clusters of small isolated wetlands provide important functions as an ecological
complex.”169 The Court’s dismissive attitude towards the value of urban
wetlands is symptomatic of a broader trend in wetland banking of relocating

161 See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 494–96 (2009); Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739; Norton v.
S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 65–67 (2004); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83,
106–09 (1998); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031–32 (1992); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–71;
see also William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y F. 247, 273–79
(2001) (noting tension between Justice Scalia’s typical approach to statutory interpretation and his opinions
regarding environmental citizen suit provisions); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature:
Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1440–41 (1993) (arguing
that the Court intended its “seemingly odd” ruling in Lucas to “isolate the ecological regulations which Justice
Scalia seeks to illegitimate”).
162 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2592 (2013).
163 Id.
164 Supra Part III.A.
165 DEEPWATER HABITATS, supra note 160 (“There is no single, correct, indisputable, ecologically sound
definition for wetlands, primarily because of the diversity of wetlands and because the demarcation between
dry and wet environments lies along a continuum or gradient.”).
166 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592; DEEPWATER HABITATS, supra note 160.
167 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592.
168 See id. at 2591–92.
169 J. B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Effects of Wetland Mitigation Banking on People, NAT’L WETLANDS
NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Washington, D.C.), Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 1, 8, available at http://wetlandsnewsletter.
org/pdf/28.02/Ruhl.pdf.
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wetlands from high-value urban areas to rural areas with low land costs,
resulting in an imbalanced reallocation of wetland ecosystem services.170
The Court also discussed the wildlife found on the property, and
characterized the animals as of the type “that often frequent developed areas,”
indicating that further development would not have a negative impact on the
animals, or that the wildlife is not of the type worth protecting.171 This
assertion directly conflicts with the Florida statute requiring administrative
agencies, such as the District, to consider the conservation of wildlife and
habitat (not just endangered or threatened species) when issuing permits for
activities concerning the alteration of wetlands.172
2. Local Government
An additional aspect of the Koontz opinion is the Court’s deeply distrustful
attitude toward local government decision-making.173 If Penn Central
represents a high point for the Court’s flexibility regarding local government
decisions, Koontz may be evidence of a new low.174 For example, Justice Alito
strongly declared in the first paragraph of the opinion that the District
“believe[d] that it circumvented Nollan and Dolan because of the way in which
it structured its handling of [Koontz’s] permit application.”175 This assertion
does not comport with the District’s Wetland Resource Management Technical
Staff Report, which recommended denial of Koontz’s application because the
project as proposed failed to meet the regulatory requirements, and Koontz
“was unwilling to consider any additional mitigation options other than what
was originally proposed.”176 Therefore, the District based its denial on the
unacceptability of the proposed project and Koontz’s refusal to negotiate with

170

Id. at 10.
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592.
172 FLA. STAT. § 373.414(1)(a)(2) (2013) (“[T]he department shall consider and balance . . . [w]hether the
activity will adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species,
or their habitats[.]”) (emphasis added). The language in the statute is the same today as when Koontz was
decided. See FLA. STAT. § 373.414(1)(a)(2) (2014).
173 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591, 2594–95 (describing local government action as “coercing people into
giving [Constitutional rights] up,” making “[e]xtortionate demands,” and attempting to evade Nollan and
Dolan).
174 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978) (explaining that the Court
has not been able to establish a “set formula” for what constitutes a regulatory taking).
175 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591.
176 Joint Appendix Exhibits, Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (No. 11-1447), 2012 WL 7687919, at *90, *92
(containing excerpts from the report, originally marked for identification as Defendant’s Exhibit 28).
171
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it, not an intentional and coercive attempt by the District to evade the
Nollan-Dolan requirements.177
The Court supported its extension of Nollan-Dolan by advancing the theory
that overbearing local governments must be restrained from engaging in
complex schemes to evade answering to the controlling precedent.178 At first
blush, the Court’s assertion seems logical: approving a permit subject to a
condition, which was already subject to Nollan-Dolan, is no different from
denying a permit until a certain condition is met.179 The Court failed to
acknowledge, however, that in Koontz the District never officially made a
specific demand. In fact, the District remained open to other suggestions, and
Koontz was the party that ended the negotiations.180 While the opinion
includes much discussion about local government extortion, evasion, and
coercion, it does not address Justice Kagan’s point in the dissent that “[the
District] never demanded anything (including money) in exchange for a
permit; the Nollan-Dolan standard therefore does not come into play.”181
Despite declining to rule on “how concrete and specific a demand must be
to give rise to liability under Nollan and Dolan,” the Court further confused the
outcome for local governments by conflating the options the District
presented.182 While the Court agreed with the District that it only needed to
present one mitigation option with an appropriate nexus and rough
proportionality to Koontz’s project to avoid liability for a taking, it combined
the mitigation options presented for the purpose of the Nollan-Dolan
analysis.183 The District argued that the Court should consider the off-site
mitigation and the reduced footprint options separately, and that if one satisfied
Nollan-Dolan then further analysis was unnecessary.184 The Court declined to
consider the options as separate ways to satisfy the test, however, because the
same 2.7 acres of Koontz’s land was at stake—whether he reduced his

177 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591 (“Nollan and Dolan cannot be evaded in this way . . . .”); Joint Appendix
Exhibits, supra note 176, at *89–92 (listing four mitigation proposals that would meet the District’s criteria,
expressing a willingness to consider other options, and reiterating Koontz’s refusal to consider other mitigation
plans).
178 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591, 2595.
179 Id. at 2595.
180 Id. at 2593 (“[The District’s] policy is never to require any particular offsite project, and it did not do
so here.”).
181 Id. at 2604 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 2598 (majority opinion).
183 Id.
184 Id.; Brief for Respondent at 41, Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (No. 11-1447), 2012 WL 6694053.
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development from 3.7 acres to one, or completed off-site mitigation to develop
the entire 3.7.185
It appears that the Court came to this conclusion because the math on the
number of acres affected happened to be the same for both options, rather than
considering the possibility that the District offered both to Koontz as
independent ways to satisfy the permitting requirements based on the scientific
classifications of the land areas.186 Furthermore, the Court did not address the
fact that the reduced footprint option was not yet finalized pending a decision
about the size of the final approved project, as indicated by the Management
and Storage of Surface Water Technical Staff Report (Surface Water Staff
Report). The Surface Water Staff Report stated that “the applicant’s on-site
mitigation proposal would be sufficient to mitigate for a commercial
development of smaller size on this site (assuming the relevant water quality
and quantity were met).”187 After Koontz, a local government must defend each
option presented to an applicant during negotiation as a possible way to satisfy
Nollan-Dolan in the event of a takings claim, but cannot be certain of which
options the Court will consider separately.188
Furthermore, the Court’s position that state and local governments are
“especially” likely to engage in “the type of coercion that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine prohibits because the government often has broad
discretion to deny a permit that is worth far more than property it would like to
take” conflicts with studies that show that state and local governments are
actually lax regulators, particularly with respect to environmental regulation.189
In fact, economic studies have shown that federal regulation of environmental
pollution may be most desirable due to the very real threat of a “race to laxity”

185

Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598.
Id. (“Petitioner claims that he was wrongfully denied a permit to build on those 2.7 acres. For that
reason, respondent’s offer to approve a less ambitious building project does not obviate the need to determine
whether the demand for off-site mitigation satisfied Nollan and Dolan.”); Joint Appendix Exhibits, supra note
176, at *134–35.
187 Joint Appendix Exhibits, supra note 176, at *134 (emphasis added).
188 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598.
189 Id. at 2594; NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, INC., LAND USE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES: A
HANDBOOK ON THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 317 (Elaine Moss ed., 1977) (“[L]ocal governments have
failed to adopt needed controls or to enforce them effectively.”); Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental
Programs: A Study in Political Influence and Regulatory Failure, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 824–25
(1990) (noting that “many [states] have been reluctant to expand their roles in natural resources management”,
and that “[s]tate action . . . conflicts frequently with scientific knowledge and understanding”); Patrick J.
Skelley II, Comment, Finding the Pearl in the Oyster: Strategies for a More Effective Implementation of
Virginia’s Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 417, 431–32 (1997).
186
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among the states if left to their own devices.190 Possible reasons for this
phenomenon include the inability to fund large-scale environmental programs,
the misconception that action by merely one state will have no effect, or that
states lack the expertise and technology.191 In addition, local governments can
be hesitant to implement and enforce state environmental plans due to
heightened visibility at the local level, reelection concerns, the fact that
demands from state level can appear overly bureaucratic, and the attractiveness
of a “race of laxity” to attract economic opportunities.192 While the Court is
concerned about coercive overregulation at the state and local level, the
relevant scholarship points in the opposite direction.
One counterargument to the position that local governments are actually lax
is that local governments are tyrannical overregulators when communities are
overly homogeneous, disenfranchise vulnerable groups, or are captured by
narrow interests.193 This logic is flawed, however, in that homogeneity or local
government capture do not necessarily lead to overbearance, as the Court fears
in Koontz.194 Corrupt local governments can also choose laxity or strictness as

190 Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition
Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 67, 98–105 (1996). Compare Vicki
Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 544–45 (1991) (“A community then can quite justifiably seek a ‘second best’
solution: a benefit that substitutes or makes up for the harm for which there is no feasible or cost-effective
solution.”), Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “to the
Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 278 (1997) (“[T]here is little reason to believe that state environmental
standards established in the absence of a federal framework will be optimal.”), Joshua D. Sarnoff, The
Continuing Imperative (but Only from a National Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 225, 278–85 (1997) (“[A] reason for federal environmental regulation is to prevent
states and localities from engaging in a welfare reducing ‘race-to-the-bottom.’”), and Richard B. Stewart,
Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental
Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211–12 (1977) (“[A]ny individual state or community may rationally decline
unilaterally to adopt high environmental standards that entail substantial costs for industry and obstacles to
economic development for fear that the resulting environmental gains will be more than offset by movement of
capital to other areas with lower standards.”), with Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:
Rethinking the “Race to the Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1210, 1242 (1992) (“The conclusions that emerge from this review of the theoretical literature point strongly
against race-to-the-bottom claims.”).
191 Butler, supra note 189, at 823–26.
192 Skelley II, supra note 189, at 432–33.
193 See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in
Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 32–40 (1992).
194 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594; see also Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 193, at 34–35 (indicating
that the problems with pluralistic local government decisions stem from: (1) not all major land use interests
being represented, and (2) that community land use interests may not represent the interests of the larger
region, neither of which clearly result in under- or overregulation).
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a way to perpetuate their power and subordinate vulnerable groups, depending
on which suits their needs at the time.195
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR ACHIEVING
FLEXIBILITY AND REDUCING CONFUSION WITHIN THE KOONTZ FRAMEWORK
Although Part III critiqued several shortcomings of the Koontz opinion,
Koontz represents a continuing trend towards strengthening private property
rights in the courts. Despite scholarship showing that land-use planning is
“intensely local” and not easily contained by legal tests, Koontz is the current
state of the law, and local governments will have to adapt their processes
relative to its holdings.196 Specifically, this Part discusses how local
governments may respond to address the lower takings threshold and
confusion about which mitigation options presented during permitting
negotiation may now be potential liabilities in a takings claim, as discussed
above.197 First, section A establishes why procedural flexibility is important for
quality land-use decision-making, indicating that local governments will want
to find out how to maximize flexibility under Koontz. Section B considers and
rejects several popular suggestions of ways that local governments could react
to Koontz. Section C concludes this Part by recommending a new model for
permitting, described as a “negotiated permitting process.”
A. Flexibility Leads to Better Land-Use Decision-Making
This section argues that procedural flexibility for local governments leads
to better land-use outcomes based on the history of local government land-use
decisions, the unique characteristics of local governments, empirical data about
the negative impacts of increased rigidity, and the inherently flexible nature of
exactions. This analysis seeks to establish that regulatory flexibility is a
positive and necessary element of local land-use decision-making; therefore,

195

Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 193, at 32, 37.
See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994); Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834–37 (1987); Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land
Controls as Problems of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 839 (1983) (noting in 1983 that “during the
last two decades, judges and legal scholars have shown increasing doubt that local governments make land
development decisions fairly and rationally—that is, with a reasonable distribution of burdens among
individuals, and with the care and deliberation commensurate with the long-term implications of land
development”). Cases and legal scholarship indicate a trend toward increasing limitations on local government
discretion regarding exactions from the 1960s through today. See, e.g., id.
197 Butler, supra note 189, at 830; supra Part III.B.2.
196
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local governments should work to recapture some of this flexibility following
Koontz.
First, a history of deference toward local land-use decisions indicates that
regulatory flexibility for local land-use decisions is preferable. Prominent
property law scholar Professor Carol Rose observed in her classic article,
Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as Problem of Local
Legitimacy, that local governments have always used a flexible, “piecemeal”
approach to local land-use planning, even when using more rigid legislative
zoning measures.198 This is partially because modern American local
governments evolved from colonial settlements during a time when “factors
such as geomorphology, climate, religion, and economic organization yielded
contrasting forms of local governments.”199 Although much has changed from
colonial times, the need to adapt to unique local circumstances remains.200
For example, when comprehensive zoning became popular in the 1950s
due to government subsidies, local governments began to publish
comprehensive zoning measures for less intense use than actually anticipated,
and later rezoned for more intense uses on a case-by-case basis.201 Over the
past several decades, however, courts have grown suspicious of local
governments’ ability to administer such flexible programs due to fear of local
corruption, based in part on the Federalist theory that local jurisdictions tend
more towards homogeneity and factions.202 This lack of faith in local
governments’ ability to make reasoned land-use decisions on a case-by-case
basis without coercing property owners into conferring unwarranted benefits
slowly led to increasingly strict judicial review, but it was not always so.203
The Oregon Supreme Court expressed this shift in Rose’s illustrative case
Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners, and the sentiment can be found in
the Nollan, Dolan, and now Koontz opinions.204
198

Rose, supra note 196, at 853.
RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND USE AND SOCIETY: GEOGRAPHY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 236–37
(rev. ed. 2004).
200 Id.
201 Rose, supra note 196, at 849.
202 Id. at 851, 855.
203 See NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, INC., supra note 189, at 317 (“In the past virtually all land use
decisions involving private land were made at the local level of government. Today, as the states are redefining
their responsibilities regarding land use problems and federal legislation increasingly affects such concerns,
land use is no longer a strictly local matter . . . .”).
204 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (2013) (“[L]and-use permit
applicants are especially vulnerable to the type of coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
prohibits because the government often has broad discretion to deny a permit that is worth far more than
199
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Second, because local government bodies are distinct from larger state and
federal legislative bodies, courts should set standards that reflect those
differences and facilitate improved local government decision-making. While
acknowledging that “local bodies making piecemeal land decisions may be
unreliable as legislatures in a Madisonian sense,” Rose proposed that these
differences are indicative of “some solution outside the traditional separation
of powers,” rather than a fatal shortcoming.205 If a local government is unlike a
larger legislative body, regulatory checks should reflect the distinction by
focusing on the mechanisms that make a local government work well:
“citizen[] participation,” or voice, and “possible departure,” or “exit.”206
Therefore, acknowledging that local governments are unlike large legislatures,
judicial review should emphasize flexible standards that promote political
participation backed by a real threat of departure, rather than formulaic tests
that do not reflect the varied reality of local government decisions.
Third, interviews with local officials and judicial outcomes of challenges to
land-use actions have revealed that increased rigidity is detrimental to the local
regulatory process. In 1990, Professor Lynda Butler conducted a study of state
regulatory failure using Virginia as a model state.207 Butler conducted
interviews to ascertain the “perceptions and views of state and local officials
responsible for environmental and land-use regulation.”208 Butler ultimately
concluded that the administrative process was burdened significantly by the
then-current takings case law.209 In the article, Butler analyzed the Nollan
decision and observed that local officials in particular expected Nollan and
similar opinions to result in an “increase in litigation and . . . a chilling effect
property it would like to take.”); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994) (“The city’s goals . . . are
laudable, but . . . ‘[a] strong public desire to improve the public condition will not warrant achieving the desire
by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.’” (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 416 (1922))); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (“In short, unless the permit
condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid
regulation of land use but ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’” (quoting J. E. D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of
Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H. 1981))); Fasano v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 507 P.2d 23, 30 (Or. 1973)
(“[H]aving weighed the dangers of making desirable change more difficult against the dangers of the almost
irresistible pressures that can be asserted by private economic interests on local government, we believe that
the latter dangers are more to be feared.”).
205 Rose, supra note 196, at 887; see also Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 193, at 1–2 (“Despite courts’
almost ritualistic invocation of the presumption of constitutionality, the reality is that the presumption does not
immunize land-use decisions from intense judicial review to the same degree that the presumption immunizes
acts of Congress and state legislatures from Supreme Court review.”).
206 Rose, supra note 196, at 882–83, 887, 910.
207 Butler, supra note 189, at 826–27.
208 Id. at 827–28.
209 Id. at 830.
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on government regulation of land use.”210 The officials reported experiencing
less flexibility in decision-making for fear of getting the law wrong.211 Butler
confirmed these fears, finding that challenges to new land-use measures
resulted in unpredictable outcomes in various state courts.212 Per Butler’s
reasoning, adding another case reaffirming and expanding the formulaic
Nollan-Dolan test increases confusion and reduces flexibility, intensifying
burdens on state and local officials.213
Finally, flexibility towards regulatory exactions is justified because
exactions are an inherently flexible tool. Exactions and other similar measures,
such as floodplain and wetland regulations and public nuisance laws, are
designed to aid regulators in adapting to intensely local and individualized
circumstances that are not adequately addressed with the blunt tool of
Euclidean comprehensive zoning.214
B. Possible Local Government Reactions to Koontz
Despite the reasons supporting flexibility for land-use decisions discussed
above,215 the expanded Nollan-Dolan test is the new reality for local
governments.216 It is important to understand that while Koontz has created
new confusion about which mitigation options will be subject to the
Nollan-Dolan test during takings litigation,217 the opinion did not expressly
preempt flexible negotiation. Koontz holds that Nollan-Dolan applies to
210

Id.
Id.; see also PLATT, supra note 199, at 304 (explaining that even a mere perception of broadening
property rights “may become a self-fulfilling expectation if political bodies, administrative agencies, and lower
courts are persuaded that the pendulum is swinging in the direction of private rather than public interests”).
212 See Butler, supra note 189, at 832–34 (“Recent challenges to innovative land use measures adopted in
Virginia and other states demonstrate the low predictive value of takings case law.”).
213 Id. at 837–38. At the time, Butler pondered whether the case’s impact would be limited to cases of
physical invasion of property or where there was an actual conveyance of property. See id. In Koontz, the
Court clarified that Nollan is not so limited, but rather applies broadly, including to requests for easements and
money. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2603 (2013).
214 PLATT, supra note 199, at 305 (noting that Euclidean zoning was poorly suited to address physical land
variations); Sean F. Nolon, Bargaining for Development Post-Koontz: How the Supreme Court Invaded Local
Government 30 (Vt. Law Sch., Faculty Working Paper No. 1-14, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2400689 (“Judicial decisions restricting [local governments’] ability to bargain reduce th[e] opportunity to
create value.”); see Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379–85 (1926) (landmark decision
finding an aesthetic comprehensive zoning scheme constitutional).
215 Supra Part IV.A.
216 See Nolon, supra note 214, at 22 (“I agree with Kagan’s concern and hope that future courts move
quickly to clarify when a pre-decision proposal becomes a demand triggering Nollan-Dolan scrutiny. Until that
time, land use boards must live in the world as it is and exercise appropriate caution.”).
217 Supra Part III.B.2.
211
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conditions attached to permit denials as well as permit approvals, which limits
flexibility due to fear of an increased risk of takings claims, but does not
explicitly prevent local governments from negotiating with permit
applicants.218 Empirical data shows that local officials have demonstrated high
familiarity with the Nollan and Dolan decisions, and the attention that the APA
dedicated to Koontz indicates that officials will modify behavior in response to
the new addition.219 Exactly how officials may adapt exactions procedures in
response to increased potential liability for regulatory takings remains an open
question.220 This section explores some possible local government responses
and discusses why local governments should avoid them.
One option is for state and local governments to move away from
now-riskier permitting and implement intensely detailed comprehensive zoning
schemes.221 Legislative limits on land use that apply to a vast number of people
are less suspect than individual burdens, answering the Court’s concern in
Koontz that one individual would bear an unfair burden at the hands of an
extortionate government.222 Such actions are more democratically accountable,
and the best recourse for dissatisfied parties is through the political process.223
However, exactions developed to allow local governments to adapt to changing
circumstances.224 It is not clear that a move away from exactions would fix the

218

Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595.
Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollack, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme Court’s Takings
Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 116 (2001) (finding that
“California planners have a high awareness of the cases, particularly of Nollan and Dolan,” and that “no
county planners and fewer than 10% of city planners report[ed] no familiarity with [Nollan]”); Supreme Court
Expands Takings Test, supra note 3; 106th National Planning Conference April 26–30, 2014: Final Program,
AM. PLAN. ASS’N, 40, 53, 81, 84, https://www.planning.org/conference/program/pdf/final.pdf (showing
various panels discussing Koontz—including a panel titled “Koontz—Clarity or Calamity?”—scheduled for the
APA’s 2014 National Planning Conference).
220 See, e.g., Chuck Cohen, Op-Ed., Supreme Court Decision in Koontz Case May Complicate
Development in California, PAC. COAST BUS. TIMES, July 19, 2013, http://www.pacbiztimes.com/2013/07/
19/oped-supreme-court-decision-in-koontz-case-may-complicate-development-in-california/; Adam Lovelady,
The Koontz Decision and Implications for Development Exactions, COATES’ CANONS BLOG (July 1, 2013),
http://canons.sog.unc.edu/?p=7191; Potential Impacts of Koontz Decision on Local Land Use Decisions, CHI.
METROPOLITAN AGENCY FOR PLAN. (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.cmap.illinois.gov/about/updates/-/asset_
publisher/UIMfSLnFfMB6/content/potential-impacts-of-koontz-decision-on-local-land-use-decisions.
221 See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 511, 533–37 (2012).
222 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594; Mulvaney, supra note 221, at 536–37.
223 See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395–97 (1926); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445–46 (1915).
224 Fenster, supra note 9, at 622–23; see supra Part IV.A (discussing the origins of comprehensive zoning
and the benefits of flexibility in land use planning).
219
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problem as such a scheme would have to be burdensomely intricate and would
likely still require the use of variances over time.225
Another option, as predicted by Justice Kagan’s dissent in Koontz, is for
local governments to deny subpar permit applications outright, without any
negotiation. While Kagan agreed that approving a permit with a certain
condition was the same as denying a permit pending a certain condition, the
Koontz opinion leaves open the issue of when the government makes a
demand.226 Kagan observed that “[i]f a local government risked a lawsuit every
time it made a suggestion to an applicant about how to meet permitting criteria,
it would cease to do so; indeed, the government might desist altogether from
communicating with applicants.”227 Despite Kagan’s point, the majority
opinion did not define when a demand has been made, but repeatedly referred
to the District’s conditions as such.228 Furthermore, the Court declined to
consider the District’s off-site mitigation proposal and reduced-footprint
mitigation proposal as alternative options. This expands the potential for
liability, making it more likely that a local government will prefer to merely
deny permits outright because it is difficult to predict which suggestions a
court will consider as distinct alternatives.229
Conversely, officials’ unwillingness to discuss mitigation options could
lead to under-regulation due to permits granted on either insufficient exactions
or extra-regulatory, possibly illegal, bargains between local officials and
developers.230 Both outcomes undesirably limit economic growth and other
positive benefits accompanying new development “to the detriment of both
communities and property owners.”231
A final possibility is states and local governments may adopt alternative
negotiation and mediation measures to facilitate and improve land-use
decision-making. This option is appealing because it has the potential to allow

225 See supra Part IV.A (discussing the necessary benefits of flexibility in local land use
decision-making).
226 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2609–10 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
227 Id. at 2010.
228 Id. at 2593, 2598 (majority opinion) (characterizing the petitioner’s belief that “the District’s demands
for mitigation [were] excessive,” and noting that “respondent’s offer . . . does not obviate the need to
determine whether the demand . . . satisfied Nollan and Dolan”) (emphasis added).
229 Id. at 2598; supra Part III.B.2.
230 Fenster, supra note 9, at 654–57, 665.
231 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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for greater flexibility,232 providing an avenue where both parties can reach an
agreeable compromise that is possibly preferable to a solution that would have
been reached in a traditional adversarial setting (such as a quasi-adjudicatory
permitting process). Proposals for alternative regulatory procedures have been
popular with environmental and land-use scholars for decades.233 Proponents
argue that mediations are cost-effective, issue-focused, and superior for
addressing technical and scientific concepts.234
While the above points are valid, site-specific exaction disputes between
private landowners and local governments are not well-suited to the mediation
process.235 First, mediation involves the aid of a neutral mediator, but land-use
decisions require the professional opinions of subject-matter experts, such as
government-employed engineers, urban planners, and environmental scientists,
in order to determine whether an application meets certain legal standards.236
For example, in Koontz, the reason that the District did not accept Koontz’s
original proposal was because it did not meet the legal requirements set forth in
Florida law.237 Therefore, it does not make sense (if it is even procedurally
possible) to place the dispute between an applicant and the permitting authority
(or intervening advocacy group) in front of a separate mediator who has no
expertise in the matter when, ultimately, the permitting authority is constrained
by science-based legal standards.
Second, both parties must agree to enter mediation, and a permitting
authority cannot force a private applicant outside of the application process
established by state laws.238 This would introduce another layer of uncertainty
and confusion into a process administrated by local governments with limited
time and resources.239 Finally, the point of mediation is to reach one final
compromise, still leaving open the question of what would happen in a

232 See supra Part IV.A (arguing that greater flexibility for local officials is preferable in land use
decision-making).
233 See Rose, supra note 196, at 887 (arguing that land use decisions are better analyzed as
mediation-inspired rather than quasi-adjudicative); John L. Watson & Luke J. Danielson, Environmental
Mediation, 15 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 687, 689 (1983); Lawrence Susskind & Alan Weinstein, Towards a
Theory of Environmental Dispute Resolution, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 311, 336–37 (1980).
234 Watson & Danielson, supra note 233, at 689–90.
235 Id. at 690–91; Fenster, supra note 9, at 677 (“Certain communities at certain moments . . . may lack
the willingness, ability, and information to negotiate fairly and inclusively.”).
236 Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 233, at 314.
237 Joint Appendix Exhibits, supra note 176, at *90, *92.
238 See Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 233, at 314.
239 Butler, supra note 189, at 825–26.
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scenario where the applicant walks out of negotiations, like in Koontz.240 In
sum, local governments are not likely to adopt standard mediation as a method
for increasing flexibility in dealing with the Koontz decision, but mediation has
many positive qualities that can be incorporated into a recommendation for
local governments in adapting to Koontz.
C. A “Negotiated Permitting” Procedure Will Allow Local Governments to
Reclaim Flexibility in Exactions Settings
Although Carol Rose proposed that courts should review exactions
proceedings as mediations rather than quasi-adjudications, the fact remains that
they are not actually true mediations.241 Building on this idea of exactions
proceedings as functionally mediation inspired, this section analogizes to
federal negotiated rulemaking to propose a “negotiated permitting” model as a
way for local governments to reclaim flexibility following Koontz. The
negotiated permitting framework will minimize a local government’s increased
exposure to takings claims after Koontz by capturing the collaborative spirit of
negotiated rulemaking, and ultimately producing one mitigation option.
Negotiated rulemaking is a consensus-based process originally devised as a
way to improve rulemaking outcomes in federal administrative agencies.242
The procedures, endorsed by Congress in the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of
1990,243 supplement procedures in the Administrative Procedure Act by
allowing an agency to assemble a committee that meets publicly to negotiate a
proposed rule.244 If the group reaches an agreement, the agency may adopt the
rule according to Administrative Procedure Act procedures.245 The consensus
is not binding on the agency, but is rather intended to reduce the likelihood of
later challenges to the rule, assuming that the representation and negotiation
process has resulted in a compromise agreeable to most.246 Despite continued
debate over whether true negotiated rulemaking actually works (or is even a
good idea) these concerns are outside the scope of this Comment, which
declines to weigh in on the efficacy of negotiated rulemaking at the federal

240

See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2593 (2013).
Rose, supra note 196, at 887.
242 Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 13–14 (1982).
243 Pub L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570a (2012)).
244 Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46
DUKE L.J. 1255, 1257 (1997).
245 Id.
246 Id.
241
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level.247 Here, the example of negotiated rulemaking is taken only as a
procedural analogy because there are many aspects of this process that are
applicable to local land-use decision-making.
An adapted negotiated permitting process modeled on negotiated
rulemaking is feasible in the land-use permitting setting because many of the
factors that lead to effective negotiated rulemaking (or the absence of which
arguably lead to poor negotiated rulemaking) are present in a local permitting
setting. The factors applicable to exaction decisions are: (1) “countervailing
power” between the applicant, the permitting authority, and third-party
interests; (2) “limited number of parties;” (3) “mature issues;” (4) “inevitability
of decision;” (5) “opportunity for gain,” both for the applicant and the
permitting authority; (6) openness to tradeoffs; and (7) high likelihood of
“agreement implementation.”248
Applying the factors above to the facts of Koontz as a case study, both the
District and Koontz had countervailing power: the District had the power to
grant the permit, and Koontz had the power to walk away and sue.249 There
were only two parties, and the issue did not require any further development.250
The District’s own procedures inevitably required it to make a decision.251
Both parties had something to gain: Koontz wanted a development permit, and
the District wanted wetlands mitigation.252 Both were willing (to an extent) to
make tradeoffs.253 Finally, implementation of a mutual decision, had one been
reached, was nearly certain.254
Therefore, this Comment proposes a model for land-use decision-making
that is similar to negotiated rulemaking, although the final outcome will be a
case-by-case determination about a permit application, rather than a broad rule.
In addition, one should note that the analogy is not perfect because in
negotiated rulemaking, the administrative agency must start § 553
247 Id. at 1258 (“[T]he instrumental value of negotiated rulemaking has more often been asserted than
demonstrated.”).
248 See Harter, supra note 242, at 45–52.
249 See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2592–93 (2013); Harter, supra note
242, at 45–46.
250 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591.
251 See 1 ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE PERMIT
APPLICANT’S HANDBOOK § 5 (2013), available at, http://floridaswater.com/handbooks/pdfs/ERPhandbook_
volI.pdf [hereinafter PERMIT HANDBOOK] (including information about required timing for permit processing).
252 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592–93.
253 Id.
254 See PERMIT HANDBOOK, supra note 251, § 5.
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rulemaking255 after the negotiation process has been completed, and the
negotiations do not become part of the record, nor are they subject to judicial
review.256 With negotiated permitting, the negotiations would be part of the
record in the event that the ultimate decision was challenged in court. The idea,
however, is that negotiated permitting will capture the spirit of negotiated
rulemaking’s consensus-based process, and at the end the authority will only
open itself to liability for the one condition it approves, similar to the way that
a federal agency is only liable for the one rule it ultimately promulgates.
Per the negotiated permitting model, the permitting authority will consider
a permit application in a collaborative way, inviting various interested parties
to participate.257 The permitting authority can explain the legal requirements
for granting the permit and suggest alternatives, while weighing the concerns
of the applicant and third parties.258 Parties will work together, aided by
subject matter experts and a facilitator if necessary, to reach an agreeable
solution.259 One advantage of this model is that it gives local governments the
opportunity to explain the scientific basis for the permit requirements, and to
perform “data mediation” if there is a conflict between an applicant’s
presentation of the facts and the permitting authority’s determinations.260 For
example, such a data conflict actually occurred in Koontz, where the District
found the wetlands to be “high quality,” while Koontz’s hired environmental
consulting firm found the wetlands to be “of minimal (or no) regional
significance.”261 Other advantages of the model include the decreased
likelihood of judicial challenges once a negotiated decision has been reached
and the possibility of establishing an ongoing relationship of communication
and compromise between developers and permitting authorities.262

255

See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
Id.
257 Harter, supra note 242, at 52–53 (arguing that “any interest that would be substantially or materially
affected by the regulation should be represented” in a negotiated rulemaking, as determined on an ad hoc basis
by the relevant agency); Nolon, supra note 214, at 31 (“[T]he presence of multiple parties in most significant
development decisions . . . creates room for value creation.”).
258 Harter, supra note 242, at 59 (promoting agency participation in rulemaking as a way to “tap the
expertise and resources in the private sector” and “reduce the need for development of vast factual material”).
259 Id. at 77–79.
260 Id. at 89–91.
261 Indeed, there was a clear conflict between the District’s and Koontz’s findings regarding the land at
issue. Compare Joint Appendix Exhibits, supra note 176, at *89–90 (District’s exhibit), with id. at *14
(Koontz’s exhibit).
262 Harter, supra note 242, at 102, 110.
256
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Continuing the case study example, suppose that Koontz and the District
had framed the permitting process as a negotiated permitting. The engineers,
scientists, and urban planners employed by the District would have
investigated the area based on Koontz’s application. If their scientific findings
conflicted with the assessments of Koontz’s privately hired environmental
consulting firm, both parties could have compared the results to discover why.
The District could have made mitigation suggestions freely, without fear of
increasing potential takings liability with each option. An attorney for the
District could have explained the permit requirements under Florida law, and
Koontz could have contributed his own suggestions within that framework.
Third parties, such as environmental protection advocates, homeowner
associations, or nearby business owners could have added information for
consideration. In the end, the parties could have reached a mutually agreeable
solution in accordance with Florida law.
The key to the negotiated permitting model is that at the end of negotiations
the permitting authority will approve the permit subject to one condition. This
is true whether the negotiations end in a mutually agreeable outcome or the
applicant walks away dissatisfied with the choice. Per this model, the District
would have issued a permit approval subject to only one condition in Koontz,
despite the other conditions discussed during negotiations. As with negotiated
rulemaking, none of the options suggested by the District during the
negotiation process would be subject to judicial review, only the one condition
attached to the final approval.263 While the one final condition would still be
subject to Nollan-Dolan if Koontz sued, the District could carefully decide
what the one condition should be, considering the “nexus” and “rough
proportionality” requirements and building a record to support the decision.264
This would eliminate confusion about whether officials had made a “demand,”
and would allow officials to carefully consider the legal basis of the condition
should the issue land in court.265
Note that these procedures are substantially similar ones that local
governments already follow. For example, in Koontz, District officials offered
several mitigation options to Koontz, but concluded that his project as
proposed failed the regulatory requirements.266 The District indicated the
263

See id. at 82.
See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591 (2013).
265 See id. at 2598 (“This Court therefore has no occasion to consider how concrete and specific a demand
must be to give rise to liability under Nollan and Dolan.”).
266 Id.
264
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collaborative nature of the permitting process by listing four potentially
sufficient mitigation options, and inviting Koontz to choose his preferred
combination of the options.267 The District’s handbook also illustrates the
inherently flexible nature of the permitting process by stating that
“[i]nnovative mitigation proposals which deviate from the standards described
in this handbook will be considered on a case-by-case basis.”268 The novel
aspect of the negotiated permitting model is that it advises the permitting
authority to approve one option when a disgruntled applicant walks away from
the negotiations, as opposed to leaving several amorphous options on the table,
each potentially exposing the permitting authority to takings liability. Like
with negotiated regulation, where the agency can still perform § 553
rulemaking269 regardless of whether the parties produce a mutually agreeable
rule during negotiations, permitting authorities can approve a permit subject to
a condition even if the applicant doesn’t like the condition.
Some may argue that this model is procedurally burdensome, or that a
permitting authority will not be able to come to a reasoned decision with so
many competing interests.270 The benefits of this model outweigh the burdens,
however, largely because it is substantially similar to negotiation procedures
already employed by local governments.271 The model reduces uncertainty
following Koontz by restoring negotiating flexibility and effectively returning
local governments to a pre-Koontz universe by eliminating judicial review of
remediation suggestions issued prior to a permit denial.272
CONCLUSION
While it is true that exactions must meet a threshold of constitutionality,273
this Comment has argued that the risk of overregulation at the hands of local
government, as the Court feared in Koontz, is less compelling than the need for
flexible land-use decision-making. In the Koontz opinion, the Court
mischaracterized aspects of environmental and local government policy, and
extended the Nollan-Dolan test to demands imposed prior to permit denials

267

Joint Appendix Exhibits, supra note 176, at *90–92.
Id. at *152.
269 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
270 See Harter, supra note 242, at 110–12.
271 See Rose, supra note 196, at 887–93 (arguing that “piecemeal changes” in land use planning are “more
realistically perceived as mediative than quasi-judicial”).
272 See supra notes 241–47 and accompanying text.
273 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
268
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without clarifying when a local government has made such a demand. The
Koontz decision created uncertainty for local governments regarding their
exposure to takings liability and, as a result, has negatively reduced regulatory
flexibility. Finally, this Comment acknowledged Koontz as the new reality for
local governments, and suggested that they seek flexibility within the Koontz
framework. As such, it recommended a novel “negotiated permitting” scheme
as a procedural solution for limiting expanded potential for liability under
Koontz.
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